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ABSTRACf
This paper uses the results of a survey of more than 3500 private employers to
determine whether use of the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (rITC) alters the level of a fIrm's
employment and/or whom the fInn hires. We estimate that each subsidized hire generates
between .13 and .3 new jobs at a participating fIrm. Use of the program also appears to
induce employers to hire more young workers (age 25 and under). Our results suggest,
however, that at least 70% of the tax credits granted employers are payments for workers who
would have been hired even without the subsidy. Such payments represent mere transfers to
employers.
This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the
ILR School. It is intended to make the results of Center research, conferences,
and projects available to others interested in human resQ~rC~ management in
preliminary form to encourage discussion ans suggestions.
INTRODUCTION
For more than a decade federal employment policy has included provisions for
subsidies to employers who hire welfare recipients or people who fall into certain other
categories of disadvantaged worker. The most prominent of these subsidies is the Targeted
Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC). Until the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the TJTC program offered
employers a tax credit of 50% of the fust year wages up to $6000, and 25% of second year
wages up to $6000 for hiring any worker certified to be eligible. Currently the program
offers 40% of wages up to $6000 during the fust year. Eligible workers include economically
disadvantaged ex-offenders, the vocationally-rehabilitated handicapped, and recipients of Aid
for Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and/or general assistance. Though use was
initially slight, the scale of the program has been rising, so that by the mid 80's nearly 700,00
workers were being subsidized under the program.
The pwpose of targeted employment subsidies is to increase employment of eligible
workers. The subsidy can accomplish this by inducing fums to create new jobs (expand
employment) which are then filled by targeted workers, and/or by encouraging finns to hire
targeted workers to fill slots normally occupied by noneligible workers. In practice, a fIrm
which receives a TJTC subsidy may do neither. The finn may simply be claiming a tax
credit for an employee who would have been hired even without the subsidy. The purpose of
this paper is to determine the extent to which receiving tax credits for hiring TJTC eligibles
represents each of the following three components: a) net job creation, b) replacement of
nontargeted workers with targeted ones, or c) receipt of a subsidy for a worker who would
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have been hired in any case. No previous study has attempted to make this measurement. 1
Yet the issue is important for policymakers who clearly prefer expansion of employment (a)
to merely making transfer payments to employers (c).
This study is conducted using a survey of more than 3400 employers specifically
designed to address the issues described above. To determine whether TJTC induces finns to
expand employment we estimate the impact that hiring TJTC-subsidized workers has on
employment growth. The periods of time for which we have data are 1981 and part of 1982.
We then examine whether TJTC alters who the finn hires. Ideally this would be
accomplished by estimating the impact of TJTC use on the proportion of targeted workers in
the fInn's work force. Because fInns generally don't know how many of their workers meet
TJTC's complicated eligibility requirements, however, our survey used the proportion of
young workers (under 25) as a proxy for the proportion of targeted workers.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the employer survey used in
this study. Section 2 specifies the model of employment growth used to determine whether
use of TJTC causes net job creation at the fInn. Section 3 presents the empirical results for
the employment growth effect of TJTC. Section 4 presents estimates of the impact of TJTC
on the proportion of young workers at the fInn. Section 5 summarizes and draws
conclusions.
1 Burtless(1985} presents experimental evidence that programs like TITC may actually reduce the employment
of targeted workers by stigmatizing them in the eyes of potential employers. This suggests that even if the current
study finds that employers who hire targeted wolkers are creating jobs for them, it will not guarantee that the overall
effect of the program is to increase their employment
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1. THE DATA
Our data are drawn from a survey of more than 3400 business establishments
conducted in two waves. The fIrst wave was carried out in the fIrst quarter of 1980 by the
Institute for Research on Poverty of the University of Wisconsin under the auspices of the
Department of Labor. (Westat Inc. did the actual interviewing.) The second wave, of 3412
of the original fInns, was conducted by the National Center for Research in Vocational
Education of the Ohio State University (NCRVE) in 1982. (The Gallup Organization did the
interviewing.) The establishments surveyed were located in a set of 28 geographic sites. The
sites overrepresented the Southeast, especially the Gulf coast, and underrepresented the
Northeast. The probability that a given fmn at a given site would be sampled varied directly
with the size of the finn. The NCRVE Survey provides data on employer use of TJTC
programs in 1980, 1981 and early 1982. It also contains data on fmns' use of programs
under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and the Job Training
Partnership Act (JTPA) for calendar 1980 and the period from January 1980 to the interview
date in early 1982.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics on the rates of use of TJTC by employers in
our sample. These participation rates are not representative of those of the general population
of fmns. Because the fIrst wave of the NCRVE survey (in 1980) informed respondents about
the existence of these programs, familiarity with TJTC among respondents in the second wave
TABLE 1
PARTICIPATION IN TITC BY SIZE OF ESTABLISHMENT
Number of Employees Total Total Not
Weighted by Weighted
Size by Size
1-9 10-49 50-99 100-499 500+
1.Percent receivedTJTC 3.8 4.6 7.3 5.1 29.4 14.6 4.3
in 1980
2. Percent receivedTJTC 2.6 4.4 9.9 19.8 47.5 21.3 3.5
betweenJan. & Sept. 81
3. Percent receivedTJTC 2.3 2.8 8.2 17.9 34.9 16.1 2.7
between Sept. 81 and
Apr. 82
4.TJTC-subsidized
.7 .6 .7 0.2 2.9 1.0
employees in 1980 as %
of employment
5. TJTC-subsidized
.4 .5 .7 0.4 5.4 1.8
employees"in 1981 as %
of employment
Rows 1, 2, 3 are weighted by employment in 1980 and the inverse of the probability of selection.
.Data are for fIrst 9 months of calendar 1981.
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was about 75%.2 We believe this to be a higher rate of familiarity than would be observed
in the general population of fmns.
Columns 1, 2, and 3 present participation rates by establishment size for three periods:
1980, the ftrst 9 months of 1981, and for the period from September 1981 to the interview
date in 1982, respectively. The period January-September 1981 is separated from the rest of
1981 because the rules for certifying eligibles changed in September 1981. After that time
eligible workers could be certifted only on or before the ftrst day of work, and cooperative
education students were no longer eligible unless they were disadvantaged. This rule change
disallowed the retroactive certiftcation which had previously been widely observed among
participating fmns. Overall utilization rates in our sample were under 5% for all periods.
Larger fmns were much more likely to use the program than small fmns. This is consistent
with fmdings from the ftrst wave of the survey (Bishop and Montgomery, 1986). Note that
the rule change in September 1981 lowered participation rates for establishments in all size
categories.
2. THE IMPACT OF TITC ON EMPLOYMENT
In this section we present an empirical model of the impact of TJTC on the total
employment level of fmns which get a subsidy. Programs such as TJTC fall under the
general heading of targeted marginal employment subsidies. They are "targeted" because they
2 About 17% of the establishments interviewed in the first wave were familiar with TITe. We expect that
interviewing these firms in 1980 may have increased the proportion of them using the program in 1982, but we see
no reason to expect that it would distort the relationship between usage and employment growth. Having informed
the firms earlier should not bias the coefficient of TITC use in the growth models.
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subsidize only workers in certain demographic categories. They are "marginal" because only
additional workers are subsidized, not those already employed before the start of the program.
The theoretical effects of marginal employment subsidies, both targeted and nontargeted, have
been analyzed in a number of works by Bassi (1985), Layard and Nickell (1980), Perloff
(1982), Bishop and Wilson (1982), and Montgomery and Wilson (1985). A subsidy like
TJTC can influence total employment at a fIrm by causing labor to be substituted for other
factors of production (the substitution effect) and/or by increasing total output (the output
effect).
The output effect of an employment subsidy occurs if reduced cost can lead to a price
reduction, thereby increasing quantity of the product demanded. Bassi (1985) argues that a
marginal subsidy targeted to a relatively small demographic group is likely to have a very
minor effect on output of the fIrm. The substitution effect associated with an employment
subsidy can increase total employment in two ways. First, it can cause the firm to substitute
labor for capital. Second, it can cause the fInn to substitute less-productive targeted workers
for more-productive nontargeted workers. Even with a fIxed output level such substitution
could raise total employment.
In spite of its theoretical potential for raising employment, there are good reasons to
hypothesize that a fIrm may hire a relatively large number of TJTC-subsidized workers
without actually creating new jobs. TJTC is not a true marginal subsidy of the type described
in the theoretical literature, it is actually a "recruitment" subsidy. This means that a fIrm need
not expand its complement of targeted workers in order to obtain a subsidy, as it would under
a true marginal subsidy. It need only hire a new targeted worker, even one who merely
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replaces a nontargeted worker. The elasticity of substitution of targeted for nontargeted
workers may, therefore, be very high. With high substitutability the employment gain per
TJTC hiring may be very close to zero.
The Specification of the Growth Equation
The discussion above suggests the null hypothesis that hiring TJTC-subsidized workers
does not influence an establishment's employment level. Empirically estimating the effect of
TJTC on the level of a firm's employment is difficult, however. Employment level is
determined by numerous factors which are difficult to observe and control for, factors such as
relative input prices and technology. If these factors are relatively stable over a short time
interval, however, they have little or no impact on the growth of employment during that
interval. This implies that we can estimate a model of employment growth which excludes
these factors with only minimal risk of omitted variable bias. For this reason we chose to
estimate the effect of the TITC program on a firm's employment growth rather than its
employment level. Our model mimics the approach taken by Perloff and Wachter (1979) in
assessing the employment impact of the New Jobs Tax Credit of 1977.
To develop this model we begin by assuming that the level of a finn's employment at
a point in time, 1;, is related to the number of subsidized workers in its workforce, TITC"
plus a vector of other characteristics,~. For the moment we let the relationship be linear.
E81 = « + PTJTC81 + yX81 + e: (1)
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where all values are measured at the end of the subscripted year, and E is an error term - E
- N(O,<J£). TJTCst is defmed here as the stock of subsidized workers at the end of 1981. As
a proxy for this stock we use the number of subsidized hires made during 1981.3 If the
subsidized workers were simply hired to fill slots which would normally go to nonsubsidized
workers, or if the fmn claims a credit only for workers it would have hired anyway, then B =
O.
As stated above, instead of estimating equation (1), which would require a
substantial complement of X variables, we use a model of the change in employment. If we
assume no structural change in n, B or 'Ybetween 1980 and 1981, then from (1) it must be
the case that
ES1-ESO (TJTCS1- TJTCSO> (X81-XSO>
= P + y + wE E E (2)
where E = is the average of Eso and Est, and w - N(O,<J t. In fact, however, we prefer not
to assume that B is stable between 1980 and 1981. The change in rules disallowing
retroactive certification and disqualifying cooperative education students makes structural
stability unlikely. Therefore, we estimate a model which includes separate measures of usage
for 1980 and 1981 (as a proportion of employment).
3 1be number of subsidized hires in 1981 will understate the stock of TJTC-subsidized workers if many of
those hired between January 1980 and January 1981 are still with the firm. Given high turnover among workers
from targeted populations, however, many workers hired more than a year before would have left the firm, and any
who remained would be subsidized at only half the original rate.
"
Because we observe both positive and negative growth rates in our sample, the assumption that the error in
the growth equations is approximately normal seems justified. Nevertheless, that fact that about 30% of the
establishments were clustered at zero growth could call this assumption into question.
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E81-E80 TJTC81 TJTC80G81. E = ~81 E = ~80 E
+ yZ + w (3)
where Z is a vector of variables designed to capture the detenninants of employment growth.
The vector Z imitates the set of variables used by Perloff and Wachter (1979). Z contains a
long list of control variables from the fIrst and second waves of the survey, including
measures of changes in demand conditions, factors influencing labor turnover, and an array of
other employer characteristics. The full list of variables is described in Appendix A.
It is clear in equation 3 that if the effect of TJTC on employment was positive and
stable between 1980 and 1981, then
~81 = - ~80 > 0
That is, because it is the change in TJTC use which affects the change in employment,
entering current and past usage into the model separately should cause past usage to have a
negative sign.s The absolute value of ~80is a measure of the effect of TITC on employment
in 1980.
To disentangle the effects of the rule change we include regressions which measure
TJTCS1 for two alternative periods: the fIrst eight months of 1981 and the 15-20 month
period from December 1980 to the interview date. (The Z vector is adjusted accordingly.)
S Because the dependent variable in equation (3) is a percentage rate of growth, the residual variances of this
model are likely to be larger for small establishments than for larger establishments. To correct for possible
beteroskedasticity, a version of equation (3) was estimated using weighted least squares. The weights were
constructed by regressing the squared OLS error on the log of establishment size. Neither the coefficients on the
key subsidy variable nor their significance levels appreciably changed when the observations were weighted.
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The fmal specification of the employment growth equation includes one modification
from equation (3) - we relax the assumption that the effect of TITC on employment is
linear. A few very small fInns have very large ratios of TITC hires to employment. We
hypothesize that the subsidy has a diminishing effect on growth as the ratio of subsidized to
total employment rises. When subsidy usage represents a very large share of the finn's
employment an additional hire is more likely to represent a windfall to the employer than a
new job induced by the program. To allow for this nonlinearity the marginal impact of TITC
usage on growth is assumed to be a step function that has a discontinuity at TITCsl/E equal
to 0.5. (The decision to use .5 as a cutoff, though somewhat arbitrary, seemed a reasonable
choice.)6 It is hypothesized that the coefficients on the upper portion of the splines will be
closer to zero than the coefficients on the lower portion of the splines.
Regression Results for Employment Growth
Columns 1, 2, and 3 in Table 2 report the results of OLS estimation of alternative
fonns of equation (3). Columns 1 and 2 relate to employment growth from 12/80 to 12/81.
Column 3 represents the period from 12/80 to the interview date. Because TITC use is likely
to be correlated with participation in the on-the-job training programs, the models in Table 1
also control for use of the CETA and JTPA programs. Current usage of CETA is represented
by CETAsl. Past usage is represented by CETAso (a dummy) and CETA19which contains all
6 More fonnally, because we are using a spline, we include two TJTC usage variables: one equal to TJTC-
certifications/employment up to half of employment (min [TJTc;JE. .5]) and one equal to TJTC-
certifications/employment above half of employment (max [(TJTc;llE)-.5, 0]. A spline was used instead of a
quadratic in order to avoid multicollinearity in the 2SLS models.
TABLE 2
EFFECf OF TJTC ON EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AT SUBSIDIZED F1RMS
(t-statistics are in parentheses)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Method: OLS OLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS OLS
Time Interval: I 2J8Q-I 218 1 12180-12181 12180- Interview 12180-12181 12I80-Interview 12180-1218 I
(NewlHircs)
TJTC,11E
Upto .5
.334** .216 .308*** .894" .908" .0660
(2.0) (1.4) (2.3) (1.0) (1.1) (.88)
Above.s
-.055 -.043 -.048
-.615" -.77ft* --...-
(.5) (.4) (.7) (1.0) (1.9)
TJTCsJE ---- ---- --...- -.013 ---- -.063"
(.30) (1.26)
Upto .5
-.250* -.251" -.372"* ---- ---- ----
(1.9) (2.1) (2.2)
Above.5
.022 .049 .076
---- ---- ----
(.8) (.7) (.7)
CETAsIIE> 0 ---- .092** . .058*' ---- ---- ----
(4.1) (1.9)
CET AsoaIIE
---- ---- ---- -.390 -.583 .046
(.93) (.98) (.28)
Up to.s
.086 ---... ---- .758" 1.14" -.079
(1.0) (1.1) (1.18) (.34)
CETA..JE > 0 ---- .007' -.030 ---- ---- ----
(.4) (1.1)
CET A,JE > 0 -.085* -.094*
-.162*** -.134* -.261*" -.111*"
(1.8) (2.2) (2.8) (1.9) (2.60) (2.21)
R2
.086 .094 .107 .086 .095 .114
Sample 3255 3255 3255 3115 3115 2298
.These are 0-1 variables for whether a subsidized worker was hired.
"
Variable is replaced by its predicted value.
0 Variable is a ratio of subsidized hires to new hires
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subsidized hires in 1979 including those for CETA, TITC, and the Work Incentive Tax
program (WIN). (In 1979 most subsidized workers were hired through CETA.) What this
means is that the CET A79 variable is measured with some error. Still, because use of TJTC
and CETA are likely to be correlated, we need to control for CETA use to avoid having its
influence bias the TITC coefficients.7
As expected, the results in Columns I, 2, and 3 in Table 2 give estimates of 1\\ and
B80which are opposite in sign but close in absolute value. The coefficients on the lower
portions of the splines are significant in almost all cases. The absolute values for both 8s\
and of Bsoare centered around .3, and
~8O has the expected negative sign. These values imply
that for every 10 subsidized hirings, up to half of employment, approximately 3 new jobs are
created. The coefficients on the upper portions of the splines are close to zero and
insignificant for all TJTC variables. The CETA variables also show statistical significance
though their coefficients are small.
The Potential Endogeneity of Usage
Because finns with high employment growth will have more job openings which
might potentially be filled with TJTC-eligible workers, use of the subsidy may be
endogenous. In this case the OLS coefficients on TJTCs\ and CET AS\ will be biased upward.
7 A number of alternative specifications were tried with the CETA variables. In models not reported, a splined
version of the CETA variable was included as a regressor. The coefficient on the upper portion of the spline was
negative and larger in magnitude than the coefficient on the lower portion of the spline. This result was rejected
on a priori grounds, so only the lower portion of the spline is included in the specifications reported.
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To cope with the potential endogeneity, equation (3) was reestimated using two stage least
squares (2SLS).
Because the problem of endogeneity of usage was anticipated when the survey was
designed, a great deal of thought was put into the development of questions which would
provide a set of instruments for a 2SLS model of employment growth. The key was to obtain
measures of variables which would influence TJTC hirings but not employment. Earlier
studies have found that a fInn's decision to participate in a subsidy program is significantly
influenced by personal contacts about TITC from local program administrators (Bishop
[1985], Bishop and Kang [1986], and Bishop and Montgomery [1986]). Such contacts should
have no exogenous impact on employment growth, however. Therefore, the survey contained
a set of questions about personal contacts and other questions specifIcally designed to produce
instruments for a 2SLS model. Bishop (1985) found that the effect of a personal contact on
the decision to participate in TITC depended on a number of establishment characteristics
such as the number of employees, previous subsidy use, proportion of young workers at the
fInn and others. These characteristics were interacted with the contact variables to expand
the set of instruments. A detailed discussion of the set of instrumental variables is provided
in Appendix B.
The 2SLS results are presented in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. The coeffIcients on
TJTCs. up to 50% of employment are very large but not statistically significant. The
coefficients on the upper portion of the splines are negative, and in one case significant. The
2SLS coefficients imply that 10 TJTC hirings produce about nine additional jobs at the fInn.
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Unfortunately, these numbers are not plausible. The coefficients on CETAs1 are actually
negative, though not significant.
Given the assumed positive feedback of employment growth on subsidy usage,
reestimation of the employment growth equation using 2SLS should have lowered the
coefficient on TJTC use. Instead, point estimates got larger and the statistical significance
declined. Our interpretation of these results is that despite careful efforts to design questions
which would provide an appropriate set of instruments, those instruments obtained were
apparently not sufficient to capture the structural relationships with the necessary degree of
precision. We believe that this may prove to be an inescapable problem with all
nonexperimental evaluations of employment training programs.
An Alternative to 2SLS: Subsidized Hires as a Proportion of All New Hires
In view of the unsatisfactory nature of the 2SLS results, a second approach to the
problem of simultaneity bias was employed. Simultaneity causes the estimates of 881 obtained
from the OLS estimation of (3) to be positively biased. The alternative approach is to
provide another estimate which is also biased, but biased in the opposite direction. If the
TJTC usage variable can be reconfigured so that the simultaneity biases its estimated effect
towards zero, we may at least be able to place a lower bound on the program's true impact on
employment at the firm (while the OLS results will represent an upper bound). We
accomplish this by replacing the ratio of subsidized hires to employment with the ratio of
TJTC-certified workers hired in 1981 to all workers hired in 1981. If employment growth has
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a strong positive effect on the number of new hirings, using new hirings in the denominator
of the TJTC-use variable should build in a negative bias in its coefficient. The results of
regressions using this approach are reported in Column 6 of Table 1. Because a splined
model gave a large negative coefficient on the upper portion of the spline, the model
presented constrains the upper portion to be zero.
The coefficients on TJTC use as a proportion of new hires have a low level of
significance. However, the implied impacts of TJTC on employment growth are considerably
more reasonable than for the 2SLS results. Transforming the coefficient on TJTCS1 in column
6 to reflect jobs created per certification (by multiplying by the mean ratio of employment to
certifications, which is 2 in our sample) the new-hires model implies that the number of
added employees per TJTC certification is .13.S This is about 40% of the impact estimated
from the first model in Table 2. It represents, we believe, a reasonable lower bound on
TJTCs impact on employment at participating finns.
S To convert the coefficient on the effect of an increase in certifications as a proportion of new hires to the
effect of certifications as a proportion of employment, we multiply the coefficient in Model 6 by the ratio of
employment to certifications via the following equation (where CERTS refers to certifications, EMPchg to
employment change and EMF to employment):
A E~~~hg]
= ~
E;:hg]
*
A NC::;~U
= p:!'
*
EMP
* [% A CERTS - % A NeWHiru ]A
[
CERTS
]
l:1
[
CERTS
]
l:1
[
CERTS
]
NewHiru %l:1CERTS - % l:1EMP
EMP New Hires EMP
where ~1NHis the coefficient from Model 6 in Table 2. The ratio of employment to new hires in our sample is 2.
Because CERTS is generally small relative to new hires and employment, we assume that the percentage change in
Certifications will dominate the percent changes in new hires and employment and the last tenn on the right will be
close to 1.
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To summarize the regression results: we fmd some evidence that TJTC does induce
participating fInns to expand employment, though this conclusion is somewhat tentative.
What is no tentative is our conclusion that at best, 7 out of 10 TJTC payments are for
workers in jobs which would have existed absent the subsidy. This does not imply, however,
that those seven payments are useless in tenns of advancing the goals of the program - the
subsidy may have induced the establishments to hire TJTC eligibles for jobs which would
otherwise have gone to nontargeted workers. In the next section, therefore, we explore the
effect of TJTC on who gets hired.
3. THE EFFECT OF TJTC ON THE PROPORTION OF YOUNG WORKERS
Even a targeted employment subsidy which does not create jobs overall may still
fulfill its primary policy objective by creating jobs for targeted workers. To accomplish this
it must have some impact on whom the fInns decide to hire. In this section we examine
whether TJTC altered who was hired by estimating its impact on the proportion of young
workers at the finn. Ideally we would like to observe the impact of hiring TJTC eligibles on
the proportion of targeted workers at the fInn, but employers are unlikely to know how many
workers meet TJTC's complicated eligibility requirements. Instead of asking about the
number of eligibles, therefore, the survey asked about an easily-identillable population into
which about 86% of TJTC eligibles fall: workers under the age of 25.
The 1982 NCRVE Survey asked each establishment 1) what proportion of its work
force was under 25 currently, and 2) what proportion was under 25 two years ago. We
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employ two alternative specifications in estimating the impact of TITC on this proportion.
First we regress the current proportion of young workers on a set of variables including the
past proportion of young workers, a TITC-use variable, and other fInn characteristics. As an
alternative we also estimate a model of the change in the proportion of youth over the
previous two years with past and current TITC use as independent variables. As above, for
the change model we expect a positive coefficient on TITCs1 and a negative coeffIcient on
past usage. In this case, however, past usage is CETA79which includes subsidized hirings
from all programs.
The other independent variables in these equations differ only slightly from those
included in the growth models. A run including the full set of independent variables appears
in Appendix A. One important difference, however, between the employment-growth models
and proportion-youth models is the inclusion of employment growth itself as an independent
variable in the latter. Rapidly growing fInns should be more willing to select younger, less
experienced workers to fill vacancies. We expect, therefore, that the coefficient of
employment growth will be positive in the proportion-youth models.
The TITC usage variable, TITCS1' in the proportion-youth models includes one
important modification from the growth models. Finns can deliberately select targeted
workers over nontargeted workers only if the fonner are recognized as eligible at the time the
hiring decision is made - a fortuitous discovery of the eligibility of a recent hire should have
no direct impact on youth's share of employment. Our usage variable, therefore, is not the
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proportion of workers who are eligible, but only the proportion known-to-be-eligible at the
time they were hired.9
Estimation Results for Proportion of Young Workers
The estimation results for the two models of youth share of employment are presented
in Table 3. The TJTCsI variable is highly significant in both the level model and the change
model. Furthermore, the positive and significant effect of employment growth on the youth
share implies that TJTC has both a direct and indirect impact on the proportion of young
workers at the firm. To gain some sense of the magnitude of these effects we use an
example. Consider a ftrm with 100 workers, 27% of whom are youth (our sample mean).
Using the coefficient from column 1 in Table 3, hiring 10 TJTC eligibles raises the
proportion of youth to 28.2% directly. But, according to Table 2, these hirings also increase
growth of employment by 3% which raises youth's share by another .2% (that is, by 3 x
.067). This further increases the proportion of young workers to 28.4%. These calculations
imply that the 10 subsidized hires open 2.4 jobs for young workers (that is, .284*103 - 27) in
a ftrm of 100 workers. 10
9 As in the growth models, our proxy for the proportion of known-to-be-eligibles at the finn is the number
hired in the relevant time period.
10 These estimates are rough for two reasons. First, the proportion of workers under 25 is a crude proxy for
the proportion of targeted labor - young workers form only a portion of the targeted population (in our sample
about 85%). Second, in the proportion-youth equation we used the hiring of known-to-be-eligibles while in the
growth equation we used all subsidized hirings. 'The effect of all subsidized hirings on the proportion of young
workers might be smaller than that used above to calculate the displacement
TABLE 3
IMPACT OF TARGETED EMPLOYMENT SUBSIDIES ON THE SHARE OF THE
WORK. FORCE UNDER AGE 25
(T-statistics are in parentheses)
Level Model Change Model
TJTCs1a .114*** (2.12)
up to .5 .120*** (2.1)
above.5 .007 ( .2)
CET A79 -.07* (-1.8) -.069** (2.03)
Employment Growth
1980-1982 .069*** (5.2) .078*** (5.8)
Proportion under
Age 25 in 1980 .829***(75.0)
--
R square .718 .046
Sample 2879 2879
a Variable represents hiring of workers known to be eligible at the time of hiring.
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels respectively.
TJTC: page 17
What do the coefficients in Table 3 imply about the extent to which TJTC hires cause
intrarmn displacement of nontargeted workers? The above example suggests that the 10
subsidized hires generated about 3 new jobs and that 2.25 of these went to youth, creating an
additional .75 jobs for adults. Taken at face value these numbers would absolve TJTC of
causing significant displacement of adult workers. They imply that the program may even
increase adult employment slightly by causing finns to expand. TIris calculation, of course,
uses our most optimistic fmding about the effect of TJTC on the subsidized fmn' s
employment. But even if using TJTC were to have a zero impact on a fmn's employment,
the 10 subsidized hirings in our fmn of 100 workers would displace 1.82 adults. This is still
a reasonably small displacement effect. Our overall conclusion, therefore, is that any
intrarmn displacement of adults caused by TJTC is likely to be fairly minor.
4. CONCLUSIONS AND DISCUSSION OF POUCY IMPLICATIONS
This paper used the results of a unique survey of employers to estimate a) the extent
to which using the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit (TJTC) induced subsidized employers to expand
employment and b) the extent to which TJTC use caused the participating fmn to hire more
targeted workers. Our best estimate implies that no more than 3 new jobs are created at a
participating establishment for every 10 subsidized hirings that establishment makes. Our
estimates of TJTC's impact on youth's share of employment suggest that TJTC use does
significantly increase the hiring of targeted workers. Furthermore, these additional targeted
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workers do not appear to displace nontargeted adults (though they may displace nontargeted
youth).
Perhaps the most interesting implication of our results is that when the government
grants a tax credit for these 10 subsidized hirings, at least 7 of those tax credits are paid for
job slots that would have existed even without the subsidy. Policy makers might be pleased
nevertheless if those other 7 hirings represent a transfer of jobs from nontargeted workers to
targeted ones. But our results imply otherwise. We fmd that 10 hirings create less than 2.5
jobs for young workers. If targeted youth are displacing nontargeted youth our results may
understate the program's potential to create targeted jobs. Still, we are led to conclude that
the great majority of claims for tax credits are for workers who would have been hired even
in the absence of the subsidy. These are simple transfer payments to employers.
What do our results imply about the cost of job creation under TJTC? Program data
for fiscal 1985 (the most recent available) indicate that the TJTC program made tax
expenditures of about 505 million dollars for 621,889 certifications. This gives a cost per
TJTC certification of about $812 per certification. Using this measure of certification cost,
our most optimistic results about the employment effect of TJTC imply that in our sample the
cost of creating a job through TJTC was $5270. Our more pessimistic results (using the last
model in Table 2) suggest a cost of $11,581 per job created. The lower figure is fairly
consistent with similar estimates made elsewhere in the literature. For example, Bassi's
(1985) simulation model predicts that jobs created through a targeted marginal subsidy will
cost between $2198 and $5708 a piece. Bishop (1981) estimates the costs of jobs created by
the New Jobs Tax Credit as costing between $2000 and $5500 per job. The higher of our
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estimates, $11581 per job created, is about twice the upper bound of the Bassi and Bishop
estimates. Yet we think this estimate to be closer to the true cost. 11
It was recognized that problems caused by possible simultaneous equations bias in our
estimates require that our results be viewed with some caution. However, given the effort
which went into designing the NCRVE survey specifically to address the issues raised in this
paper, we believe that our estimates are not only the best available measures of TJTC's
impact on participating fInns, but the best which are ever likely to be produced for the time
period studied. The fact that we obtained measures of the level of usage of the subsidy gives
our study more power than similar attempts to measure the impact of employment subsidies.
For example, in their study of the New Jobs Tax Credit of 1978, Perloff and Wachter (1980)
were able to test only whether having "heard of' that program caused fIrms to grow more
rapidly. At the very least we have been able to set a reasonable upper bound on the effect of
a subsidized hiring on a fIrm's total employment; it creates between .13 and .3 jobs. Placing
the impact within this narrow a range provides information which should prove useful in the
design of employment policy.
A fmal caveat should be offered about the employment effects discussed in this paper.
We have estimated the impacts of TJTC on employment at participating fIrms only. These
effects may be offset to some degree by reductions in employment in competing fIrms, or
fl1111sproducing capital goods (see Perloff [1982]). Such general-equilibrium considerations
are beyond the scope of this paper, however.
11 We calculate these values by multiplying the coefficients on the upper and lower portions of the splines
in the relevant model by the mean sample ratio of certifications to employment above and below .5, respectively.
This gives the estimate of jobs created per employee at the finn. We divide this value into the subsidy payments
per employee at the finn, using $812 as our estimated payment per certification.
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Appendix A
Independent Variables in the Employment Growth Equation
The specification of the percentage employment growth equation used in this study
parallels that used by Pedoff and Wachter (1979) in examining the employment impact of the
1977-78 New Jobs Tax Credit - a nontargeted marginal employment subsidy. Pedoff and
Wachter, using a Census survey of establishments, regressed the percentage change in
employment on I) percentage change in nominal sales, 2) a set of 4 size-of-establishment
dununies, 3) a set of 3 regional dummies, 4) a set of I-digit industry dummies, and 5)
dummies for which tax form the fIrm used (an indicator of type of proprietorship). Their key
program variable was a dummy for whether the fIrm knew about the New Jobs Tax Credit.
Our estimation of the employment growth equation improves upon that of Pedoff and
Wachter in having more detailed data on establishments and a larger sample. First we
included a set of variables designed to capture exogenous changes in demand conditions. In
this category we included the percentage change in real sales over the previous two years.
This variable which may be endogenous, but, like Pedoff and Wachter, we lacked an
appropriate set of instruments with which to use an instrumental variables model. We also
include a proxy for previously-anticipated changes in demand conditions: the change in
employment from 80 to 82 anticipated by the establishment at the time of the fIrst-wave
interview.
A second set of variables relates to the establishment's experience with labor turnover
(all taken from the fIrst wave of the survey). The rationale here is that holding constant the
conditions of product demand and labor supply, turnover may affect employment growth by
dictating the number of hires required to maintain a given size of the workforce. Finally, we
included a set of more general characteristics of the establishment and its workforce such as
size, the proportion of skilled workers, the proportion unionized, and others. One variable
which our data set lacked was a direct measure of average wages of workers at the
establishment. Our survey provided information on wages only for the last worker hired. As
a measure of the establishment's wage position relative to other establishments, we regressed
the wage of the last hired worker on a vector of characteristics of the worker and the job for
which he was hired. The error from this regression was used as a measure of whether the
establishment paid higher wages (a positive error) or lower wages (a negative error) than
other establishments hiring this type of worker in a similar job.
We also included detailed set of industry and location dummies.
A sample run for the models of employment growth and proportion of young workers
appears in Table AI.
TABLE Al
SAMPLE RUNS WITH FULL SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARlABLES
EMPLOYMENT PROPORTION
VARIABLE MEAN (STD. DEV.) GROWTH (t-stat) YOUNG (t-stat)
12180-INTERVIEW
Program Variables
TJTC.tlE
Up to .5 .0088 (.05) .308 (2.29) .120 (2.10)
Above .5 .0312 (.08) -.048 (-.67) .007 (.19)
TJTC.JE
Up to .5 .007 (.04) -.372 (-2.21)
----
Above .5 .002 (.06) .076 (.75) ---...
CETAIt > 0 .038 (.19) .058 (1.87) ----
CETAIO > 0 .045 (.21) .030 (1.05) ----
CETA79 > 0 .023 (.10) -.168 (-2.77) -.07 (-1.81)
Change in Demand
L\Emp
-.028 (.40) ---- .069 (5.22)
MYnp > 0 .091 (.22) --...- -.02 (-1.04)
Expected %L\Unit Sales .042 (.27) .386 (7.01) .015 (.56)
Actual %L\Unit Sales> 0 .084 (.23) -.266 (-4.28) .018 (.60)
Expected MYnp 80-82 10.73 (48.27) .001 (5.23) ----
Turnover Variables
New Hire Rate '79 .089 (.12) -.008 (-.13)
----
Quit Rate '79 .048 (.08) ---- -.046 (1.00)
Fire Rate '79 .015 (.05)
---
.086 (1.25)
Layoff Criterion .41 (.27) .007 (.32)
----
(seniority=l,
productivity=O)
Flexibility to Fue '79 49.65 (50.0) ---- .000 (1.13)
Length of Probation 2.81 (1.24) .027 (2.71) -.006 (-1.26)
Period for New Hires
No Probationary Period .24 (.43) -.08 (2.66) ----
TABLE Al
SAMPLE RUNS WITH FULL SETS OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
EMPLOYMENT PROPORTION
VARIABLE MEAN (SID. DEV.) GROWTH (t-stat) YOUNG (t-stat)
12180-INTERVIEW
Other Employer
Characteristics
Est. SIZE (In) 1980 2.93 (1.44) -.067 (9.58) .012 (4.42)
Est SIZE . 50' .25 (.63) .05 (3.41)
----
Est SIZElFmn SIZE .48 (1.18) -.004 (-.95) .003 (1.33)
Residual Wage (In) .00 (.32) .057 (3.24) -.020 (-2.36)
Machinery Cost (In) 1.70 (1.49) .011 (2.93) -.002 (-1.12)
Proportion Part-time .18 (.27) -.011 (-.51) .009 (.85)
Proportion Unionized .10 (.28) -.009 (-1.80) -.010 (-.92)
M'roportion Unionized -.000 (.05) ---- .012 (.72)
R2
.11 .72
.Also included were dummies for industry and location.
Appendix B
Discussion of the Variables Used as Instruments in 2SLS Models
The variables employed as instruments were those which were observed to be
important in determining whether an establishment participated in the TITC program at all
(by hiring at least one subsidized worker) in studies by Bishop [1985], Bishop and Kang
[1986], and Bishop and Montgomery [1986]. The participation studies cited indicate that the
most important of the instruments is personal contacts about TITC or CETA that were
initiated by agencies outside the firm. (An offer to refer TITC-eligible workers doubles the
probability that a fIrm participates in the program (Bishop [1985]).) Dummy variables were
created for initial contacts made by, respectively, a government agency, a trade association, a
local business organization, or some other agency. Dummies were also created for whether
the employment service had initiated a contact to offer subsidy-eligible referrals, and whether
there was more than one such contact. All dummies were defmed separately for TITC and
CETA.
Bishop (1985) found that whether an outside contact caused the firm to participate in
TITC depended on a variety of fIrm characteristics. Consequently another set of instruments
was created by interacting the dummies described above with the following fIrm
characteristics: log of establishment employment, dummies for previous use of subsidy
programs, membership in a local business organization, presence of a personnel offIce at the
establishment, share of 1980 employment under age 25, length of training period for new
hires, whether the fInn has a probationary period for new hires and the log of the length of
that period. Other instrumental variables were 1) dummies for previous use of subsidy
programs, 2) previous use of the employment service, 3) membership in a local business
organization, 4) the perceived amount of paperwork required to obtain an OIT contract, 5) a
variable measuring negative attitudes toward government, 6) knowledge of the CETA
program, 7) whether the fInn fired anyone during the fourth quarter of 1979 (a proxy for
flexibility in tenninating unwanted employees), and 8) measures of the 1979 layoff rate, quit
rate and induced quit rate, respectively.
In total the structural models of participation contained 33 variables that were not in
the structural model of growth and 28 variables that were not in the structural model of the
1981 new hire rate. The R2 the reduced form models predicting the TITC usage variable
ranged from .074 to .091.
